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1 Introduction
The interdependence between real and financial markets has a long tradition in Eco-
nomics. The literature has particularly focused on which of these two markets drives
business fluctuations and economic growth. The main research question was to under-
stand if it was the real economy to foster finance sectors or, alternatively, the credit
market to stimulate real production. In other words, the economic research has always
sought to capture the driving-force generating expansions and contractions of economic
and financial cycles, that is to seize the direction of the causality nexus. Although the-
oretical and empirical studies diverge in identifying the direction of the causality nexus,
with the pre-Lehman studies identifying the direction from real markets to financial
sectors (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997), while the post-Lehman ones reversing it (see Christiano and Ikeda, 2011;
Brunnermeier et al., 2012), what is certainly undoubted is the self-reinforcing interac-
tion between the two sectors which translates into booms followed by busts (see Borio,
2014). Yet, when credit boom bubbles go burst the macroeconomic consequences are
severe (see Jorda` et al., 2015; Mishkin, 2008). The interaction, in fact, is seen as the
key ingredient in the cycles’ onset (see, Grilli et al., 2017, for a survey of the relevant
literature). In whatever way this is modeled, either via balance-sheets interconnect-
edness among intermediaries (see Adrian and Shin, 2010a,b, 2011; Geanakoplos, 2010;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010), or more sophisticated network theory tools (see Glasser-
man and Young, 2015; Lageras and Seim, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Battiston et al.,
2007, 2012b,a; Bargigli and Tedeschi, 2014), the interaction among banks and firms rep-
resents the channel to propagate/reduce financial frictions among market participants
(see, Gertler and Williamson, 2015, for a collection of articles on this topic).
Following the pioneering financial accelerator framework by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), many attempts to model financial frictions and study
their impact on financial and real markets have been proposed (see Carlstrom and Fuerst,
1997; Bernanke et al., 1999, among the first attempts). All these studies have identified
some possible driving-force able to amplify and propagate the conventional transmission
mechanism of real and monetary shocks through the endogenous emergence of limits
on the available quantity of external finance. In this regard, an interesting branch of
literature has focused on coordination failure mechanisms as a possible explanation of
the emergence of credit frictions. Specifically, this literature has shown that the strate-
gic behavior of heterogenous interacting agents competing for the achievement of scarce
financial resources gives rise to spillovers and strategic complementarities leading to co-
ordination failure phenomena (see Rajan, 1994; Aikman et al., 2015; Bassetto et al.,
2015). Following this line of research, in this paper we are interested in identifying an
endogenous mechanism able to generate coordination failure and analyzing its repercus-
sions at micro and macro level. In this regard we build a three sector economy with
goods, credit and interbank market, where agents, banks and firms, strategically com-
pete for allocating their financial resources on an evolving credit network. On the one
hand firms, operating as borrowers in the credit market, compete in seeking the best
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credit conditions in order not to be rationed. On the other hand banks, operating as
lenders in the credit market and as lenders or borrowers in the interbank one, compete in
offering the best credit conditions in term of interest rates and supply of liquidity when
lenders, while they behave as the companies do when borrowers. The credit linkages
between borrowers and lenders might change over time via a preferential attachment
evolving procedure such that each borrower can enter into a lending relationship with
lenders with a probability proportional to a compound fitness measure. This measure is
a combination between lender attractiveness (i.e its fitness) in terms of supply of liquid-
ity and interest rates and the borrower satisfaction (i.e its intensity of choice) in terms
of credit requirements fulfillment. Lenders, therefore, can attract their customers by
offering a high supply of liquidity associated with a low interest rate and borrowers re-
inforce the lender signal when their credit requirements are met. Moreover, the conduct
of debtors which strengthen / weaken their creditors’ attractiveness on the basis of the
granted loan, generates switching behavior in this group of agents. On the one hand,
customers who meet their credit needs become loyal to their lenders and strengthen the
intensity of choice parameter. On the other hand, those agents who are rationed be-
come shoppers-around and weaken the intensity of choice parameter. The co-movement
between the intensity of choice and the fitness is able to reproduce different credit net-
work topologies ranging from the random graph to the scale-free one. This evolutionary
framework allows us to emphasize the effect of different agents’ strategies and different
network architectures on the business fluctuations.
In line with the results of the above mentioned studies on strategic complementari-
ties, this work shows that a strong coordination in the agents’ behavior may generate
a highly centralized credit network and this produces gridlock effects in the credit mar-
ket and the emergence of credit crunch phenomena. An intuition of how the credit
network architecture influences business fluctuation is as follows. Our system crosses
several steps in the credit network evolution corresponding to the different strategies
adopted by borrowers and lenders. There are times governed by the shopping around
strategy, where the lender attractiveness is very low and, therefore, the credit network is
random. Poor economic performances are associated with these periods because agents
remain small in size and, consequently, the demand of credit and the production are low.
As time goes by, some financial institutions gain credibility in the market and become
more attractive in term of supply of liquidity and interest rates. This reinforces the
fitness of these lenders which can attract several clients and ensure their loyalty. The
heterogeneity of agents, therefore, increases the fitness signal and moves borrowers to
choose the loyal strategy which is associated with a lower rationing. This process leads
to the emergence of exponential or scale-free credit network topologies. At the same
time, macroeconomic conditions improve, the credit allocation becomes more efficient
and the production increases. Gradually, the system tends to create a large financial
institution (i.e. hub) to which many loyal clients are connected. Obviously, this high
centrality in the credit network, after an initial period where the hub can meet clients’
credit needs, leads to gridlock effects and credit crunch phenomena. The hub, unable
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to satisfy its clients loses its attractiveness, the credit bubbles go bust, the aggregate
output collapses. Consequently, the system returns to a random credit network with
shopping around agents.
Interestingly enough, our approach in explaining the materialization of financial frictions
is very close in spirit to the Minskyan financial instability hypothesis, where endogenous
shifts on the degree of financial fragility of banks generate business fluctuations (see
Minsky, 1964; Ferri and Minsky, 1992). In fact, we show that swings in banks’ leverage
are associated with the sequence of life stages that financial institutions undergo, from
small decentralized entities to too-big centralized hubs. By combining the heterogenous
agents approach with an endogenous mechanism generating time-varying financial rela-
tionships, we can show that the two main ingredients explaining the evolution of risk,
namely the agents’ financial fragility and the direct or indirect interconnections among
market participants, are far from being independent and, actually co-evolve.
Our stylized mechanism, designed to combine micro behaviors with meso financial in-
terlinkages and macro performances, extends the theoretical literature dealing with the
relationship between connectivity, business and financial cycles and systemic instability
in dynamic credit networks (see, Grilli et al., 2017, for a survey of this literature). In
this regard, the contribution of this work in respect to this literature is twofold. First,
to our knowledge, this is the only study introducing in a three sectors economy, the
dynamic evolution of credit and interbank networks jointly. In fact, models with goods,
credit and interbank markets just consider random graph credit systems where, by ex-
ogenously changing the degree of connectivity among agents, the system reproduces the
well-known trade-off between systemic and sharing risk (see Grilli et al., 2014, 2015;
Tedeschi et al., 2012b). On the contrary, the literature dealing with evolutionary net-
works, just focuses attention on two-sectors’ systems composted by firm-bank, firm-firm
or bank-bank credit relationships (see, for instance, Delli Gatti et al., 2010, 2009; Be-
rardi and Tedeschi, 2017).
Second, among these last mentioned studies modeling dynamic credit linkages, the orig-
inality of this work is in the inclusion of a reinforcement mechanism between the lender
fitness and the borrower intensity of choice. Specifically, the ”endogenization” of the
intensity of choice allows us, on the one hand, to solve the well-known calibration prob-
lems associated with this parameter (see Recchioni et al., 2015; Kukacka and Barunik,
2017, for technical details), and, on the other hand, to introduce competition both on
lender and borrower side.
Last but not least, the problems arising from credit market interconnectedness have also
been highlighted by empirical studies which have emphasized the effect of preferential
trading relationships on credit availability (see Boot, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; Pe-
tersen and Rajan, 1994; Vidal et al., 2019). Although we do not want to enter into the
debate on (dis)advantages of enduring credit relations, our results certainly support a
vast literature sustaining privileged credit relationships as a tool to mitigate asymmetric
information problems. However, we show that these relationships must be established
with small local financial institutions (Presbitero et al., 2014; Strahan and Weston, 1998;
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Avery and Samolyk, 2004; Berger and Frame, 2007; Berger and Black, 2011), and do
not have to generate too-big or/and too-interconnected hubs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model by
analyzing the behavior of firms and banks and the dynamic of the credit and interbank
network. In Section 3 we present the results of the simulations. Specifically, we proceed
in two steps: firstly, we present the performances of agents and investigate how they
influence the evolution of the financial network; secondly, we study the impact of the
different network topologies on business fluctuations. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a three-sector economy with goods, credit and interbank market. The sys-
tem is populated by two constant classes of agents - firms and banks - who undertake
decisions at discrete time t = 1, ..., T .
In the good market, firms produce an homogeneous output by adopting a linear tech-
nology with capital as the only input. Due to informational imperfections on the equity
market, the capital stock evolves according to investment expenditure which in turn de-
pend on the firms’ ability in raising funds on the credit market. The role of the financial
system is twofold. First, it allows companies to finance their production plans. Second,
this is the only instrument banks have in order to earn profits. In fact, our financial
institutions, modeled as risk neutral agents, try to satisfy all the credit requests received
by their clients, by charging a risk premium on the interest rate which is proportional to
the borrower financial fragility. In other words, banks try to transform all their available
liquidity1 into credit supply which is sold at the zero-profit interest rate. In the adverse
event the bank liquidity supply is not enough to meet the firm credit demand, financial
institutions can enter in the interbank market. Here, the main purpose is to re-allocate
the available liquidity from banks in surplus to those in deficit. Thanks to this market,
therefore, borrower banks do not lose the opportunity to satisfy the credit requests of
firms and, lender banks can benefit from an extra profit coming from the granting loan
to borrowers.
Essentiality, the financial system as a whole is represented by two interconnected evolv-
ing networks: the credit and the interbank market. In the former, players are firms
acting as borrowers and banks as lenders, while in the later financial institutions are the
only players acting as borrowers or lenders as needed. The whole interaction mechanism
consists in a strategic evolutionary game, where lenders try to attract clients by offering
all the available liquidity at the cheapest interest rate and borrowers try to avoid credit
rationing phenomena. In this ‘‘struggle for credit’’, borrowers can strengthen / weaken
their trust relationship with the lender on the basis of their credit claim satisfaction.
Specifically, by means of a simple reinforcement-learning mechanism, borrowers receiv-
ing a positive feedback (i.e. pleased with their credit claim) maintain a stable lending
1The only constrain financial institutions face in the credit allocation is the ”minimum leverage
requirement” imposed by the Basel III regulatory framework.
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relationship with their lender and play the loyal strategy, while those receiving a negative
feedback try to cut their credit relationship and play the shopping-around strategy. In
each period the strategies are updated and players can switch behavior, accordingly2.
Firms
In what follows, we describe the basic ingredients of the good market. For more techni-
cal details on firms’ behavior in this market we refer the reader to Delli Gatti et al. (2005).
Technology available to the i-th firm (i = 1, 2, ..., N) in period t is represented by a
linear production function:
Yi,t = φKi,t, (1)
where Ki,t is the capital stock and φ its constant productivity. The firm sets the optimum
quantity to be produced Y ∗i,t at the beginning of each period t. Following Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993) we assume that bankruptcy is costly and the cost of bankruptcy is
quadratic in output. The firm maximizes an objective function defined as expected profit
less expected bankruptcy costs. The details can be found in Delli Gatti et al. (2005).
The outcome of the optimization problem is the desired capital:
K∗i,t =
φ− grLi,j,t
cφgrLi,j,t
+
Ai,t−1
2grLi,j,t
(2)
where rLi,j,t is the real interest rate the bank j charges to the i-th firm, g is a parameter
related to total capital costs, g > 1, c is a parameter related to bankruptcy costs, Ai,t−1
is the net worth of the firm. Desired capital (and, therefore, desired output Y ∗i,t = φK
∗
i,t)
is increasing with net worth and decreasing with the interest rate.
Investment is defined as Ii,t = K
∗
i,t −Ki,t−1. Hence the demand for credit is:
L∗i,t = K
∗
i,t −Ai,t−1 − pii,t−1, (3)
where pii,t−1 represent the profits of the firm.
As in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) the goods market is fully supply driven, that is the
firm can sell all the output it optimally decides to produce. Therefore, profits in real
term are equal to:
pii,t = ui,tYi,t − grLi,j,tKi,t = (ui,tφ− grLi,j,t)Ki,t, (4)
where ui,t is an iid idiosyncratic real shock hitting the firm demand of goods with
E(ui,t) = 1 and finite variance
3. The firm retains profits and adds them to equity.
In other words, the equity base of the firm obeys the following law of motion:
Ai,t = Ai,t−1 + pii,t. (5)
Due to the uncertainty of the environment, firm i may go bankrupt when its net worth
at time t becomes negative, Ai,t 6 0.
2A sensitivity analysis on the switching update frequency is performed in Appendix B.
3In real terms, ui,t represents the i-th selling price, which is a uniform with support (0,2].
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Banks
The j-th bank (j = 1, 2, ..., B) in period t operates in a competitive and arbitrage-free
credit market. The bank inter-day balance sheet structure is defined as Sj,t = Ej,t+Dj,t,
where Sj,t, Ej,t and Dj,t represent, respectively the total amount of liquidity, the equity
and deposit of bank j in time t. The primary function of the bank activity is to lend
its funds through loans to firms, as this is its way to make money via interest rates.
Assuming the agent risk neutrality, the bank optimal strategy is to determine the zero
expected-profit interest rate to which offering a completely elastic liquidity supply. Hence
the bank j expected profit for a loan to i is given by:
E(piBj,i,t) = r
L
i,j,tLi,j,t(1− pi,t)− rdj,t(Dj,t + Ej,t), (6)
where rLi,j,t and Li,j,tare the credit conditions in term of interest rate and total loan the
bank j applies to firm i, pi,t is the firm’s default probability and r
d
j,t the remuneration
of deposits and equity.
Let us now define the parameters appearing in Eq. 6. First, the bank j is willing to lend
to its clients as much credit as it can (i.e all its amount of liquidity Sj,t), up to the limit
imposed by the Basel III regulatory framework (BIS, 2010). Specifically, our financial
institutions are subjected to a ”minimum leverage requirement4”, which implies:
1
λBj,t
=
Ej,t
(Sj,t + Lj,t)
≥ 0.03, (7)
with λBj,t to be the bank leverage.
Second the bank has to estimate the bankruptcy probability, pi,t, of its client i. Making
use of Eqs.4-5 and recalling that the firm may go bankrupt as soon as its net worth
becomes negative, it follows that the bankruptcy state occurs whenever: ui,t =
1
φ(gr
L
i,j,t−
Ai,t−1
Ki,t
) ≡ u¯i,t. Consequently, assuming ui,t ∼ U(0, 2),the bankruptcy probability5 of firm
i is:
pi,t = Pr(ui,t ≤ u¯i,t)

0, u¯i,t ≤ 0
u¯i,t
2 , 0 < u¯i,t < 2
1, u¯i,t ≥ 2.
(8)
Finally, the bank sets the remuneration of deposits and equity, rdj,t = r¯
L
j,t−1 − j,t, with
r¯Lj,t−1 to be the average rate applied by the bank j in the previous period and j,t a iid
random variable with support (0, r¯Lj,t−1). Hence, the interest rate, r
L
i,j,t, satisfying the
4In other words, Eq.(7) defines an upper bound to banks’ total exposure, which cannot be roughly
33 times higher than their equity. Interesting enough, the maximum leverage can be also interpreted as
an anti-trust measure.
5The derivation of the firm bankruptcy probability follows Delli Gatti et al. (2005).
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free-entry condition (i.e. E(piBj,i,t) = 0) is:
rLi,j,t =
rdj,t(Dj,t + Ej,t)(
Dj,t
(1− 1
λBj,t
)
− Sj,t
)
(1− pi,t)
. (9)
The zero expected profit interest rate is increasing with the bank financial fragility, λBj,t
and decreasing with the firm’s surviving probability.
In order to complete the description of banks’ strategies, it is essential to introduce
the functioning of the interbank market. As already mentioned, this market enables
an efficient liquidity exchange among financial institutions. All banks satisfying Eq. 7
can enter the interbank market. Specifically, financial institutions with excess liquidity
enter as lenders, while those with liquidity needs as borrowers. Obviously, the use of the
two financial markets modifies infra-day balance sheet structure6 of j, now defined as
Sj,t + Lj,t + L
I
j,t = Ej,t + Dj,t + d
I
j,t, where Lj,t and L
I
j,t represent the total amount of
loan provided in the credit and interbank market respectively, and dIj,t the total amount
of debt received in the interbank system.
The credit chain works as follow. In period t, the firm i with a positive demand of
loan, L∗i,t > 0, selects its lender bank j
7. If j has sufficient liquidity supply, that is
Sj,t ≥ L∗i,t, the loan is disbursed. Otherwise, if j does not have enough liquidity supply
to meet its client need, that is Sj,t < L
∗
i,t, j tries to borrow in the interbank market.
Here, the bank j asks to its lender financial institution, k, the missing amount of loan
needed to satisfy its client i. Therefore, the demand of loan of j to k is dIj,k,t = L
∗
i,t−Sj,t.
As in the credit market, the lender has to define the credit conditions to be applied to
its client in term of total loan and interest rate. In line with the structure of the credit
system, the lender offers as much credit as it can up to the limit imposed by the modified
Eq.7 as shown in the footnote 6. With respect to the interbank interest rate, the lender
bank k applies a discount on its average credit rate, weighted by the risk of its client8 j.
Specifically, the overnight rate is:
rIk,j,t =
r¯Lk,t−1 − k,t
(1− pBj,t)
, (10)
with r¯Lk,t−1 − k,t to be the k discounted average credit rate and pBj,t the probability of
bankruptcy of the borrower j. Since the risk of the borrower bank just depends on
its credit relationship with firms, the lender bank k assigns a default probability to its
6At the same time, this implies the following modification of the Eq. 7, 1
λBj,t
=
Ej,t
(Sj,t+Lj,t+L
I
j,t)
≥ 0.03.
7The mechanism driving the lending linkages is explained in Sec.2.
8This assumption is in line with empirical evidence showing that the overnight rate is the lowest
available interest rate, and as such, it is only available to the most creditworthy institutions (see Iori
et al., 2008, for instance).
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client j in accordance with this assumption. Specifically, assuming that banks absorb
the firms’ bad-debt with their equity and go bankruptcy when their net worth becomes
negative, Ej,t 6 0, the following bankruptcy probability is applied:
pBj,t =

0 if
∑
i∈Θ
Li,j,t < Ej,t
∑
i∈Θ
pi,tLi,j,t∑
i∈Θ
Li,j,t
else,
(11)
where Θ is the set of all firms bank j lends money to, and L.,j,t the total amount of open
credit relationships of j in period t. In other words, Eq.11 can be interpreted as follows:
when the equity of j is enough to cover the entire amount of loans granted to firms,
the probability of bankruptcy of j is zero, even if no-one of j’s clients pay their debt
back. Otherwise, when j can default because of its clients’ bad debt, its probability of
bankruptcy increases with its clients’ one.
At the end of each period t, after all credit contracts have been paid in full9, the generic
financial institution j updates its profits according to:
piBj,t =
∑
i∈Θ
rLi,j,tLi,j,t +
∑
n∈∆
rIj,n,tL
I
j,n,t −
∑
k∈Ω
rIj,k,td
I
j,k,t − rdj,t(Dj,t + Ej,t), (12)
where the first two terms on the right side represent revenues in the credit and interbank
market, respectively, the third term are costs of the interbank borrowing and, finally,
the last term the costs of deposits and equity. Bank net worth evolves according to:
Ej,t = pi
B
j,t + Ej,t−1 −
∑
i∈Ξ′
Bi,j,t−1 −
∑
k∈Ξ
Bbk,j,t−1, (13)
with the last two terms on the right hand side being firms and banks’ bad debts respec-
tively10.
Similar to firms, financial institutions go bankrupt when their equity at time t becomes
negative Ej,t 6 0 . The failed bank leaves the market.
When firms and banks fail, they are replaced by new entrants, which are on average
smaller than incumbents11 (see Bartelsman et al., 2005).
9This hypothesis assumes that the two systems (i.e credit and interbank) operate with the same time
frequency. In fact, given the credit-oriented nature (rather than a trading-oriented one) of our interbank
system, we are modeling a system operating with longer-term maturity(see, for a similar approach,
Affino, 2012; BIS, 1983; Dinger and Von-Hagen, 2007). However, since the related literature places great
emphasis on the short-term maturity (normally overnight) of the interbank market, in Appendix B we
investigate the main performance of the model in the presence of mismatch in the markets’ time scale.
10In Eq.12, i ∈ Θ and n ∈ ∆ are the subset of borrowers, firms and banks respectively, able to pay
their debts back to j; k ∈ Ω is the subset of lenders banks, the financial institution j pays its debt back.
In Eq.13, i ∈ Ξ′and k ∈ Ξ are the subset of firms and banks unable to pay their debts back because they
go bankrupt.
11Specifically, all the initialization parameters of firms and banks, as described at the beginning of Sec.
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The formation of lending linkages in the credit and interbank network
In this section we explain formation and evolution of credit relationships, that is the way
borrowers and lenders select each others. Before describing the selection mechanism, it
is important to briefly recall how the credit chain is triggered.
In order to meet their investment plans, firms seek funding from a selected group of
banks in the credit market. If the contacted financial institutions do not have enough
liquidity to meet their clients’ needs, they enter the interbank market to borrow the
missing amount of money to satisfy firms’ demand. Here, the bank with financial needs
selects a group of lender financial institutions which can meet its liquidity need.
In our model, therefore, the two financial systems can be described with two dynamic
networks. Nodes represent agents (i.e. firms and banks) and edges are the connective
links between them. Links are directional, they are created and deleted by agents who
look for credit and point to the financial institution that grants loan. In general local in-
teraction models agents interact directly with a finite number of others in the population,
the so-called ”neighbors”. In our model the number of out-going links is constrained to
be d¯, thus borrowing agents can only get loan from few lenders. There are two important
reasons behind it. On the one hand, in a highly connected random network, synchro-
nization could be achieved via indirect links. The impact of direct credit links on the
credit granting is easier to be tested in a diluted network where indirect synchronization
is less likely to arise. On the other hand, by keeping a fixed connectivity, we can easily
compare the performance of different market topologies to spread liquidity through the
network.
Let us now describe in detail how borrowers select their lenders, that is how lending
linkages are formed and evolve in the credit and interbank system. In what follow, we
define with j the lender and with i the borrower12.
Following Bianconi and Baraba´si (2001) and Albert and Baraba´si (2002), we im-
plement an endogenous mechanism of competition among lenders in order to attract
borrowers. Specifically, lenders try to distinguish themselves via a fitness measure which
is function of their liquidity and interest rate. Banks start with identical initial condi-
tions, so that all agents have the same initial liquidity and interest rate. As time goes
by, some financial institutions may become more liquid than others or offer rates lower
than their competitors. As a measure of the lender attractiveness we define the fitness
at time t as a combination between the bank liquidity relative to the liquidity of the
most liquid agent, Smaxt , and its interest rate relative to that of the cheapest financial
institution, rmint−1 :
ηj,t = ω
Sj,t
Smaxt
+ (1− ω) r
min
t−1
r¯j,t−1
. (14)
The parameter ω in Eq. 14 represents the relative liquidity weight. With regard to the
3 (i.e. the initial value of capital, loan and net-worth for firms, and initial value of loan and net-worth
for banks) are equal to the mode of the agents active agents in the market.
12It is worth noting that both firms and banks can act as borrowers in our model. Specifically, the
former can borrow in the credit market, while the latter in the interbank system. However, just financial
institutions can act as lenders both in credit and interbank system.
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interest rate appearing in Eq. 14, two clarifications are needed. First, when the financial
institution calculates its fitness, it uses the interest rate in Eq.9 for loans in the credit
system or in Eq.10 for those in the interbank market. Second, since interest rates are
borrower-lender specific, in Eq. 14 r¯j,t denotes the lender average interest rate.
Credit linkages between lenders and borrowers in the two financial networks evolve as
follows. Each borrowing agent i starts with some outgoing link with some random agents
(i.e borrowing position), and possibly, if i is a bank, with some incoming links from other
agents (i.e lending position)13. Links are rewired at the beginning of each period, in the
following way: each borrower i cuts its outgoing link, with lender j, and forms a new
link, with a randomly chosen bank k, with a probability
Prt,i =
1
1 + e−βi,t(ηk,t−ηj,t)
, (15)
or to keep its existing link with probability (1−Prt,i). Essentially the switching proba-
bility described by Eq 15 is a function of two elements. The first one is the competition
in term of fitness between the two lenders. The second one is the borrower intensity of
choice, βi,t, which answers the question on how much borrowers trust the information
about their lenders performance. Typically, dynamic network models using the switching
behavior described by Eq. 15 consider an exogenous value of β. Specifically, these mod-
els show that by exogenously changing the intensity of choice parameter, credit linkages
self-organize themselves into very different network architectures, ranging from random
to scale-free topologies (see Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2012; Tedeschi et al., 2014; Berardi and
Tedeschi, 2017). In this paper, however, we endogenize the intensity of choice parameter.
This modification allows us to generate a completely endogenous network dynamic and
to introduce a strategic competition also on the borrowers’ side.
The evolution of the borrowers’ strategies
Let us consider the generic borrower i which has to decide whether keeping or cutting
its existing lending relationship. We define two different borrower strategies, namely the
loyal and the shopping around behavior. In the time step t, the agent i is
a) loyal if it has maintained its lending relationship with the lender j, (i → j), for
at least t− τ periods, with τ ≥ 2,
b) shopper around if it has cut its lending relationship with j before t− τ periods.
Eq.(15) shows that the intensity of choice, βi,t, is the variable the borrower controls to
switch from a lender to another one. For this reason, by increasing (decreasing) βi,t,
the switching probability diminishes (grows), and this is linked to the loyal (shopping
around) strategy. Since the borrower major concern is to avoid credit rationing, each
time period, t, i updates its strategy according to the feedback received from its lender.
13In detail, in the first time step of the simulation the adjacency matrix of the two networks are
populated as follows: we randomly assign to each lender one borrower. Consequently, each borrower has
one out-going link, while lenders equally share the list of clients.
11
Specifically, the feedback corresponds to the average variation on the credit rationing,
∆R¯i,t−τ , the borrower faces in the τ previous periods. The amount of credit rationing
is simply defined as the difference between the asked (i.e. lai,t) and the granted (i.e. l
g
i,t)
loan14,
Ri,t = l
a
i,t − lgi,t. (16)
The borrower i observing ∆R¯i,t−τ ≤ 0 (∆R¯i,t−τ > 0) receives a positive (negative) feed-
back on its strategy and, consequently, reinforces (reduces) its behaviour according to
the received signal. Specifically, reinforcing or weakening a strategy means modifying
the value of βi,t within a discrete set of possible integer values, 0 ≤ βi,t ≤ βmax.
Let now suppose that the agent i is loyal according to the definition a) above. If, in
time t, i receives a positive feedback, ∆R¯i,t−τ ≤ 0, the borrower reinforces its loyalty by
setting βi,t = βi,t−1+δ. Conversely, if i receives a negative feedback, ∆R¯i,t−τ > 0, it tries
to change its strategy by decreasing the intensity of choice, βi,t = βi,t−1 − δ. Symmet-
rically, let us suppose that the agent i is shopper around according to the definition b)
above. In case of a positive feedback, i wants to reinforce its shopping around strategy,
that is the borrower persists in changing its lender frequently, by lowering its intensity
of choice, βi,t = βi,t−1 − δ. Conversely, in case of a negative feedback, the agent tries to
change its shopping around strategy by increasing the intensity of choice, βi,t = βi,t−1+δ.
In the next sessions the micro, meso and macro consequences of this simple adaptive
learning mechanism are investigated.
3 Simulations and results
We consider an economy consisting of N = 1000 firms and B = 50 banks and study it
over a time span of T = 2000 periods. Each firm is initially given the same amount of
capital Ki0 = 100, loan Li0 = 80 and net-worth Ai0 = 20. We fix φ = 0.1, g = 1.7 and
c = 1. Similarly to firms, financial institutions start with the same initial conditions.
Specifically, the amount of liquidity is Sj0 = ν ·Li0 ·N , the initial loan Lj0 = (Li0 ·N)/B,
the net-worth Ej0 = ν · Li0 ·N , with ν = 0.08, and the deposit Dj0 = Sj0 + Lj0 − Ej0.
Moreover, we fix ω = 0.5, βmax = 20, δ = 1 and d¯ = 1.
The robustness of our qualitative results has been checked by employing Monte Carlo
techniques. We have run 100 independent simulations for different values of the initial
seed generating the pseudo-random numbers. This exercise has been repeated by chang-
ing the parameter βmax, which represents the maximum value the intensity of choice β
can reach starting from 5 to 50 with steps of 5. We have then studied the moments of
the distributions of the statistics of interest. Results confirm that our findings are robust.
We start by investigating borrowers and lenders’ performances and their effect on the
network topology. Then the repercussions of the network architecture on the aggregate
14The amount of asked loan, lai,t, corresponds to L
∗
i,t in Eq.3 when the borrower i is a firm. However,
when i is a bank, lai,t = L
∗¯
i,t − Si,t.
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dynamics are analyzed. Finally, Appendix A shows the model ability in reproducing a
remarkable high number of empirically observed regularities, spanning from industrial
dynamic to growth type stylized facts.
3.1 The evolution of the overall financial network: the competition
among strategies
In this section we analyze the mechanism driving the borrowers-lenders’ financial rela-
tionships in the credit and interbank network. Two are the main forces governing the
interaction mechanism. On the one hand, this is driven by the lender ability in signaling,
via Eq.14, its credit conditions in terms of liquidity supply and interest rate. On the
other hand, the borrower reinforces/reduces the trust in the lender via the intensity of
choice parameter, β. Since the debtor’s main concern is not to be rationed, this agent
increases its confidence in its creditor when the lender meets the credit requirements.
In this fortuitous scenario, the borrower reinforces the β parameter and becomes loyal
to its lender. Otherwise, in case of rationing, the agent reduces the parameter and acts
as a shopper around. Therefore, the overall financial network15 evolves thanks to the
co-movement of lenders which drive the fitness and borrowers which govern the fitness
intensity.
We start the analysis by explaining how lenders influence the network evolution. To
this end, we identify the bank with the highest number of clients, namely the hub. In
Fig. 1 we plot the index of the current hub (black solid line), its percentage of incoming
links (i.e its number of clients) (red dotted line) and its fitness (green dashed line), in
both the credit and interbank network (top and middle panel, respectively). The figure
shows that banks alternate as the hub during the simulation (black solid line). In fact,
as the hub acquires too many clients (red dotted line), it may happen that it is not
longer able to satisfy its customers due to liquidity shortage phenomena. In this occa-
sion, other banks may become more attractive than the hub itself, as signaled by the
fact that the fitness (green dashed line) of the hub becomes, at times, smaller than 1.
As other banks become more appealing, they start to attract more and more clients and
eventually one of them becomes the new hub. However, it is worthy of note that hubs,
even after their preeminence, often continue to belong to a small group of well connected
financial institutions. This finding is shown in Fig.2, where we display the complete list
of all financial institutions that have succeeded as hubs in both the systems, with the
respective percentage of clients, from the period 500 onwards. Moreover, by comparing
the top and the middle panel of Fig. 1 and the left and right panel of Fig.2, we observe
that the hubs in the two systems (i.e. credit and interbank market) can coincide during
different periods. This phenomenon, as explained below, generates a very strong cen-
15With the term ”financial network” we refer to both our systems (i.e credit and interbank market),
which are separately studied in our analysis. Although, in fact, the model reproduces two interconnected
networks, the bipartite nature and the star topology of the credit system do not allow us to study the
two systems as multilayer or multidimensional network. The reader can find interesting insights on
multilayer financial networks in other studies (see, for instance, Montagna and Kok , 2016; Bargigli
et al., 2015).
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Figure 1: The index of current hub (black solid line), the percentage of incoming link to current hub,
i.e number of its borrowers (red dotted line) and fitness of current hub (green dashed line), in the credit
and interbank network (top and middle panel, respectively). Equity time series of hub (black line), and
rest of lenders (red dotted line) ( bottom panel). Colors are available on the web site version.
tralization of the hub, which can not be any longer able to satisfy its too many clients.
It is worth noting that in Eq. 14 two are the key ingredients which reinforce/weaken the
hub. Lenders, in fact, compete in term of supply and cost of credit. On the one hand, the
14
Figure 2: Heatmap of all hubs which have followed from the period 500 onwards, with the respective
percentage of incoming links in the credit (left panel) and interbank market (right panel).
bank credit supply and, consequently the fitness, can be compromised by the excessive
number of clients the creditor has to meet. In this respect we find a negative correla-
tion16 between the hub in-degree in time t and its liquidity in t + τ , with τ = 1, 2, 3 in
the credit market (correlation equal to -0.26, -0.21 and -0.15 in τ = 1, 2, 3, respectively).
Interestingly, this correlation decreases considerably if we look at the second hub, that is
the lender with the second highest number of in-degree (correlation equal to -0.11, -0.09
and -0.05 in τ = 1, 2, 3 respectively). The correlation, then, becomes no statistically
significant starting from the third hub. Although they have been here omitted, we find
very similar results by analyzing the interbank market. This indicates an important
phenomenon. When the hub attracts too many borrowers, this can generate congestion
effects in financial markets making the lender unable to satisfy its clients’ requests.
On the other hand, the credit cost (i.e. the interest rate) is strongly positively affected
by the lender leverage (see Eq. 9), which in turn is influenced by the bad debt. When a
lender accords a loan to an over-leveraged agent (i.e a borrower with a high probability
of bankruptcy) it applies, via the financial accelerator higher interest rate. This, in turn,
worsens the financial condition of the borrower itself pushing it towards the bankruptcy
state. If one or more borrowers are not able to pay back their loans, even the lenders’ eq-
uity is affected by bad debts. Therefore, lenders reduce their credit supply and increase
the borrowers’ rationing. In this way, the profit margin of borrowers decreases and a new
round of failures may occur (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1999; Grilli
et al., 2014, 2015; Berardi and Tedeschi, 2017). The probability of grafting this negative
feedback is clearly more likely for the hub which is unable to closely monitor the financial
conditions of all its borrowers. In this respect we find negative correlations between the
hub bad debt and its fitness, both in credit and interbank market (correlations equal
to -0.24 and -0.22, respectively). These correlations are no statistically significant just
16By construction, in this model there is a positive correlation between the liquidity and the fitness in
t, and between the fitness and the in-degree in t.
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Figure 3: Top left: percentage of loyal and shopper around borrowers. Top right: borrowers’ equity.
Loyal (shopper around) agents are described by black solid line (red dotted line). Bottom left: equity
growth rate of loyal agents (black solid line) and network centrality (red dotted line). Bottom right:
average number of loyal and shopper around agents’ failures (black solid and red dotted line, respectively).
For credit and interbank market, first two top panels and second two bottom panels, respectively. Colors
are available on the web site version.
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starting from the second hub. This result once again suggests the negative effect that
the excessive number of clients has on the hub.
At this point a question spontaneously arises: why would a bank like to attract clients?
The answer is shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 1, where we compare the different
performances, in terms of net-worth, of the hub (black line) and the rest of banks (red
dotted line). We can observe that the hub, on average, is richer than the rest of the sys-
tem, and this justifies the emergence of lenders’ competition in order to become the hub.
Only when a hub does not clearly emerge, we observe a co-movement between net-worths.
We now describe how borrowers influence the network topology. These agents, by choos-
ing their strategy, affect the intensity of choice parameter, β, which amplifies/reduces
the strength of the fitness measure. The first and third left panel of Fig.3 show the
evolution of the two strategies in the credit and interbank market, respectively. As the
reader can see, the model is able to reproduce switching behavior between loyal and
shopping around agents. The effect that behavioral switching mechanisms, or coordi-
nation of traders’ strategies, have in generating persistence of price volatility is well
documented in economic literature (see, for instance, Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Chiarella
et al., 2009; Gaunersdorfer et al., 2008; Brock and Hommes, 1997; Tedeschi et al., 2009,
2012a). Specifically, agent-based literature focuses on the impact that these mechanisms
have on financial markets (see, Hommes, 2006, for a survey of the relevant literature).
Moreover, in recent years, also macroeconomic literature has started to analyze the im-
pact of this mechanism on real markets and its effect in generating business fluctuations
(see, for instance, De Grauwe and Macchiarelli , 2015).
The rest of this session investigates the performance of these two strategies in both
systems and their repercussions on financial relationships.
In the first and third right panel of Fig.3 we compare the different performances, in terms
of equity, of loyal (black solid line) and shopping around borrowers (red dotted line) in
the credit and the interbank market, respectively. The figures show a tight competition
between the two strategies with a slight predominance of the loyal one. Specifically,
the average net-worth of loyal borrowers in the credit market (shoppers around) over
time and simulation is equal to 1602.3 (786.0) with standard deviation 593.6 (331.8).
Similar performances between the two strategies are found in the financial market, where
the average net-worth of loyal borrowers (shoppers around) over time and simulation
is equal to 1567.8 (761.17) with standard deviation 777.3 (303.4). Whilst the highest
value of the average equity of loyal borrowers could suggest better performance of these
agents, the highest variance weakens this result. On the one hand, simulated results
explain the high value of the average net-worth of loyal agents with the low rationing
affecting this population17. On the other hand, the high variance affecting the loyal
agents’ equity can be explained by the gridlock effects that this strategy can engage. In
17Specifically, in the credit market, the average percentage of loyal agents’ rationing (shoppers
around) over time and simulation is equal to 6.2% (10.3%) with standard deviation 1.9 (0.6). In
the interbank market, these percentages are equal to 3.1% (st. dev 1.01) and 4.3% (st. dev 0.91) for the
loyal and shopping-around agents, respectively.
17
Figure 4: Top panel: network configuration at t = 200, 1500 and 1750 (left, center and right panel,
respectively). Red nodes represent banks and black firms. Bottom panel: in-degree distribution for
the same time periods in the credit and interbank system, left and right panel respectively. Colors are
available on the web site version.
this regard, it is worthy of note that the two strategies only diverge in the counterpart
search mechanism: loyal borrowers try not to be rationalized by exploiting their fidu-
ciary relationships, while shoppers-around look around to find the best credit conditions.
The first strategy tends to address borrowers to few big creditors, thus centralizing the
network, the second one, instead, disperses the debtors and decentralizes the financial
market. Clearly, an excessive concentration of debtors towards few creditors can cause
credit-crunch phenomena. In this respect, on the one side, we find positive correlations,
equal to 0.31 and 0.29, between the network centrality and the loyal agents’ rationing
in both credit and interbank system respectively ( this correlation is statistically not
significant for shopping-around borrowers); on the other side, we detect volatility clus-
tering in the growth rate of loyal-agents’ equity associated with periods of high network
18
centrality18 (see the second and fourth left panel Fig.3). This result emphasizes a key
point: loyal strategy centralizes the networks, and this generates high volatility in the
equity of loyal agents due to the possible emergence of rationing phenomena.
The second and fourth right panel of Fig.3 show another important indicator of the per-
formances of the two strategies, namely the number of failures affecting loyal (black solid
line) and shopping around (red dotted line) borrowers in both the systems. Even in this
case, we notice that loyal borrowers slightly overperform shoppers-around in the credit
system (see the second right panel). Specifically, the average number of bankruptcy, over
time and simulation, for loyal agents (shoppers around) is equal to 0.98 (1.20) with
standard deviation 0.21 (0.08). Once again, in this market, the best performances of
loyal borrowers in terms of average values are weakened by the too high variance emerg-
ing during episodes of network congestion generated by strengthening the loyal strategy
itself. However, by analyzing the interbank system (see the fourth right panel), the per-
formances of the loyal banks in term of their survival capacity are clearly above those
of the shopping-around financial institutions. This result depends on the low number of
bankruptcies in the interbank market. Given that in the model the attack is generated
by the firms’ bankruptcy in the credit market, the figure shows that the main source of
banks’ suffering ends up in the credit market without necessarily propagating into the
interbank system. However, it is worth noting that in some periods, as for instance in
t = 1476, the model generates bankruptcy cascades which correspond to the simulta-
neous bankruptcy of many financial institutions. By observing the second and fourth
left panel of Fig.3, we can deduce the reason: in this time step the credit and interbank
centrality reach their maximum value, and this generates bankruptcy cascades.
As mentioned at the beginning of this session, it is the co-movement of creditors
and debtors to determine the evolution of the overall financial network. In the top
panel of Fig. 4, we plot one shot of the configuration of the endogenous network at
t = 200, 1500 and 1750. The graphs show that the network changes its topology over
time and goes through phases of higher and lower centralization. Specifically, in the
left panel of Fig. 4, we notice a faint centralization of the system with several banks
attracting customers. As time goes by, the network becomes more and more centralized
with a small number of attractive lenders, as displayed in the central panel of the same
figure. Then, we observe a subsequent decentralization of the network, where financial
institutions are able to attract just very few borrowers, as illustrated in the right panel
of the figure19. The evolution in the network topology over time is also confirmed by the
different shapes of the in-degree distributions as shown in the bottom panel of the same
figure. As the reader can observe, although the two systems are often synchronized, as
in the periods 200 and 1500, there are times where the two topologies do not match as,
for instance, in period 1750. In this time step, we can observe that, while the credit
system is still highly centralized and its network topology is scale-free, the interbank
18As the reader can see the second and fourth left panel of Fig.3 display a time series of 10000 periods.
This allows us to highlight how this dynamic is persistent during long time horizons.
19The several phases the financial network goes through correspond to the hubs’ alternation as shown
in Fig. 1
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market is not anymore centralized and its topology is random. The dynamics of the
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Figure 5: time evolution of the shape parameter ξ of GEV distribution estimeted on the in-degree
distribution tails over time in the credit (black solid line) and interbank market (red dotted line).
network topology is better quantified in Fig.5, where we estimate20, on the upper tail of
the banks’ in-degree distribution (from the 70th percentile onward) for the credit and
interbank system, the evolution of the shape parameter ξ of the generalized extreme
value (GEV) distribution. The figure shows that, over the time, financial linkages self-
organize themselves into very different network architectures. In fact, values of ξ ≤ −0.5
represent a very rapid tail decay approaching a Poisson distribution. While values of
ξ ≥ 0 reproduce fatter tails ranging from the exponential to the power law distribution.
This proves the ability of the model in reproducing an important stylized fact of financial
networks, that is banks’ degree distributions often exhibit power law dependencies (see,
for instance, Boss et al., 2004; Iori et al., 2008). Finally, the two time series shown in
Fig. 5 provide another interesting information: the strong co-movement between the
two networks’ topologies, also confirmed by their positive and statistically significant
correlation equal to 0.66.
3.2 The impact of the network architecture on the macroeconomic
performances
We now investigate the consequences that the evolution of the financial network topol-
ogy has on business fluctuations. The validity of the results presented in this section
derives from the model ability to reproduce many stylized facts as shown in Appendix
20In order to verify the robustness of our estimation we have applied the following two-steps methodol-
ogy: 1) we have randomly extracted a subsample of 500 non-zero ξ parameter values. To this subsample
we have applied a log ratio test testing whether our ξ were significantly different from zero. The test has
confirmed that the 97% of our extractions were statistically significant. 2) Having successfully proven
the log ratio test for the value of ξ parameters, we have then employed a MLM test as in Clauset et al.
(2009) to verify whether the shape distributions are better fitted by a Poisson, an exponential or a Power
law.
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A. Specifically, having successfully proved our model for output validation, we can test
its capability in describing the impact of the financial network architecture on business
cycles.
First of all, the model robustly generates endogenous self-sustained growth patterns
characterized by the presence of persistent fluctuations, as shown in Fig.6 (left panel).
The aggregate output, indeed, shows an alternation of aggregate booms and recessions
as a non-linear combination of idiosyncratic shocks affecting individual decision-making
processes. Moreover, aggregate fluctuations, measured by output growth rates (center
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time
103
104
105
lo
g 
pr
od
uc
tio
n
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Lag
AC
F
Autocorrelation function of absolute growth rates
Figure 6: Evolution of the aggregate output (left panel) and growth rates of the aggregate output
(center panel), as a function of time. Autocorrelation of the absolute growth rates and the power law
best fit- red line, (right panel). Colors are available on the web site version.
panel of Fig. 6), are path dependent (i.e., nominal shocks have real and permanent
effects), and characterized by cluster volatility (see, for instance, Stanca and Gallegati,
1999; Tedeschi et al., 2009, 2012b; Grilli et al., 2014). A quantitative manifestation of
this fact is that, absolute growth rates display a positive, significant and slowly decaying
autocorrelation function which is well fitted by a power law (see right panel of Fig. 6).
In addition to fluctuations resembling business cycles, the simulated time path of ag-
gregate activity is characterized by broken-trend behavior as shown in the left panel of
Fig.6 where two important episodes occur: the first one at t ≈ 1000 and the second one
at t ≈ 1750.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the promises herein above made, we investigate the
key elements able to generate expansions and depressions in our model. Specifically, our
analysis focuses on two ingredients which have a clear impact on business cycles, namely
the gridlock effect caused by an excessive centralization of the two financial networks
and the financial fragility of agents. About the first point, it is worth remembering that
the networks’ evolution is driven by i) the lender fitness and ii) the borrower intensity of
choice. It is the mutual reinforcement between these two elements to make the networks
centralized to a few hubs attracting many loyal clients. In order to measure the impact of
lender fitness and borrower intensity of choice on the overall financial network, we build
an indicator detecting the co-movement between the two. Specifically, the indicator uses
the combination of the two degree centralities as a measure of the lender performance
21
and the total number of loyal borrowers in both systems as a proxy of the intensity of
choice parameter. The co-movement between the two, then, is simply the positive value
of the product between the growth rates of the two variables. Left panel of Fig.7 shows
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Figure 7: Left panel: time series of the normalized aggregate output (black solid line) and the indicator
(black dotted line). Right panel: Average correlation between aggregate output Yt and lagged leverage,
at a 1% confidence level.
the evolution of the normalized aggregate output (black solid line) and the indicator
(black dotted line). The figure confirms an important characteristic of the model: when
the both the networks are highly centralized and debtors establish strong fiduciary re-
lationships (i.e. for high values of the indicator), GDP is characterized by the onset
of bubbles. Moreover, when the indicator reaches its maximum values, the production
drastically collapses, as confirmed by the two episodes of broken-trend behavior. Last
but not least, the correlation between the indicator and the credit rationing proves that
a too centralized network, where few hubs trying to meet many loyal clients, generates
congestion phenomena and credit-crunch. In this regard, Table 1 shows the correlations
between the aggregate credit rationing and the lagged time series of the indicator Ict−τ .
The correlation shows a first positive effect of the centralization on credit supply, as
shown by the negative values at τ = 2 and 3. The effect, then, becomes detrimental
when the centralization becomes too high, as shown by the positive values at τ = 1 and
0.
Correlation Lag τ = 0 Lag τ = 1 Lag τ = 2 Lag τ = 3
R t - Ict−τ 0.1689 0.0019 -0.1509 -0.2092
Table 1: Correlations between the aggregate rationing R t and the indicator, Ict−τ , with
τ= 0; 1; 2; 3; at a 1% confidence level.
About the second point, namely the financial fragility of agents, the model reproduces
the Minskyan hypothesis of the nonlinear effect of indebtedness on economic cycle. In
fact, we observe that over periods of prolonged prosperity and economic growth financial
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institutions grant more loans without considering the overall financial fragility. However,
it can happen that banks underestimate their credit risk, making the economic system
more vulnerable when default materializes. This ambiguous effect of the leverage, first
positive and then negative, on business fluctuation, is clearly shown in the right panel
of Fig.7, where the correlation wave between the production and agents’ leverage first
increases from τ = −20 up to τ = −10, then decreases from τ = −6 up to τ = 5, and
finally, returns to increase from τ = 9.
In accordance with many other studies (see, Battiston et al., 2007, 2012b,a; Berardi and
Tedeschi, 2017; Caccioli et al., 2012; Iori et al., 2006), our results show that a combina-
tion of forces is needed to generate economic fluctuations. On the one hand, the network
topology is a key ingredient to cause these phenomena. In fact, the position of agents
in the financial network, the degree distribution and the centrality of the system, can
provoke gridlock effects and credit crunch episodes. On the other hand, agents’ financial
fragility seems to be a leading force in generating cycles. Indeed, when variations in the
level of financial robustness of agents tend to persist in time or to get amplified, credit
linkages among financially fragile firms/banks represent a propagation channel for conta-
gion and a source of systemic risk able to trigger fluctuations and broken-trend behaviors.
Robustness analysis
To better quantify these observations we apply a Fixed-Effects Panel Regression model
on the simulated database and show the impact of agents’ characteristics and financial-
network architecture on the credit supply (Model (a), hereinafter) and on the aggregate
production (Model (b), hereinafter). Moreover, we also test the robustness of Model
(a) using a different data sample just composed by loyal borrowers in both the credit
and interbank system. Given this sample restriction, then, this econometric model is a
Pooled OLS.
The general specification of the models is Yt = α+ c+ Xtβ + γdt + t, where Yt denotes
a N × 1 vector consisting of observations of the dependent variable for every borrower
i = 1, ..., b at a particular point in time t = 1, ..., T . Xt is a N ×K matrix of exogenous
economic and network covariates with associated (own) β parameters. γ is the time
dummy variable and c = (c1, ..., cN ) is a vector with borrower fixed effects to control for
all individual-specific time invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimates.
Finally, t is a vector of i.i.d disturbances whose elements have zero mean and finite
variance σ2.
Before starting the detailed analysis on the two econometric modes, some general re-
marks are essential: i) the database used in the analysis is composed of borrowers b and
lenders e. Depending on the market we are considering (i.e. credit or interbank system),
these two groups of agents are distinct subjects. More in detail, in the Model (a) with
fixed-effects, in the analysis of the credit market (interbank system) borrowers are just
firms (banks). In the OLS Model (a), in the study of the credit market (the interbank
market), our borrowers are only loyal firms (loyal banks). Finally, in the Model (b)
with fixed-effects we just analyze the credit market, and consequently, our borrowers
are only firms and lenders just banks operating in the credit system. ii) in both the
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econometric models, we consider logarithmic differences of all variables (dependent and
independent); iii) in both analyzes, the choice of a fixed-effects model is supported by
the Hausman test, which is reported at the end of each tables.
Let us now specify Model (a). Here, the dependent variable is the borrower granted loan,
Lgb . The independent variables are the borrower and lender leverages λ, the borrower
intensity of choice βb, the average degree of neighboring borrower knnb, the lender degree
dege and the lender centrality score Ce. Furthermore, we include two dummy variables:
the first one catches the role of loyalty, is loyal, the second one accounts for economic
recessions, crisis. Following Catullo et al. (2017), this second dummy identifies periods
where the production collapse21 of more than 5%.
In Tab.2 we show Model a) regression results. As the reader can notice the model with
fixed-effects reinforces the observations previously made. Specifically, an over-centralized
network generates credit squeeze, as confirmed by the coefficients’ negative value of the
intensity of choice, (i.e. βb ≈ −0.15 (−0.11) in the credit (interbank) system), the eigen-
vector centrality (i.e. Ce ≈ −0.26 (−0.07) in the credit (interbank) market) and the
degree (i.e. dege ≈ −2.02 (−0.05) in the credit (interbank) market). Also agents’ finan-
cial fragility plays a crucial role in the credit delivery. In fact we observe that ”leveraged”
lenders decrease their credit supply, as confirmed by the negative value in the coefficient
λe, which is approximately equal to −0.03 (-0.01) in the credit (interbank) system. The
negative relationship between granted loan and lender leverage is a model assumption.
In fact, following the Basel III regulatory framework, Eq.7) imposes an upper bound to
banks’ total exposure, which clearly triggers this negative relation. More unexpected
is, instead, the positive relationship between granted loan and borrower leverage in the
credit (interbank) market (i.e. λb ≈ +2.2 (+16)). With regard to this point, empirical
literature (see, for instance, Mayer, 1988; Berger and Udell, 1995) observes that borrow-
ers with a long indebtedness tradition (i.e. leveraged borrowers) have higher probability
of receiving new loans. Overall, it is the continuous leverage-loan back and forth phe-
nomenon to generate nonlinear relationships between aggregate output and leverage, as
shown in the right panel of Fig.7.
Finally, the econometric analysis reinforces another important feature of the model, that
is loyal agents have easier access to credit than shoppers around. This is confirmed by
the high positive value of the dummy variable is loyal ≈ +0.4 (+0.02) in the credit
(interbank) system.
As a whole, however, the model highlights the ambiguous relationship between credit
and loyalty. On the one hand, our results enrich the literature on ”relationship lending”
(see, for instance, Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Boot, 2000; Cao
and Shi, 2001), proving that financial institutions, thanks to long-term loyalty relation-
ships, acquire private information on their counterparts and these facilitate credit flow.
On the other hand, our analysis highlights the disadvantages of the loyal strategy. This
behavior, indeed, can cause credit crunch phenomena, that materialize during periods
of an excessive centralization of the credit network (see, for instance, Butler J. et al.,
21A sensitivity analysis on the dummy variable ”crisis” has been conducted. Econometric results
remain robust and consistent with Tab.2 by considering production drops of more than 3%, 5% and 7%.
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Model a) Fixed-effects and OLS in credit and interbank market
Dependent variable: ∆ log(Lgb)
FE model OLS model
Coefficient Credit Interbank Credit Interbank
const -0.006* -0.120*** 0.322*** -0.147***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
is loyal 0.483*** 0.024* - -
(0.048) (0.017) (-) (-)
crisis -0.237*** -0.010 -0.517*** -0.012*
(0.020) (0.040) (0.037) (0.008)
∆ log (knnb) -0.000 -0.018 0.001 -0.029
(0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.024)
∆ log (λb) 2.209*** 16.48*** 3.006*** 16.255***
(0.036) (0.379) (0.042) (0.369)
∆ log(βb) -0.158*** -0.110** -0.861*** -0.308***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.089) (0.098)
∆ log (Ce) -0.261*** -0.067*** -0.470*** -0.077***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.025) (0.018)
∆ log(dege) -2.023*** -0.055*** -1.782*** -0.070***
(0.043) (0.008) (0.043) (0.011)
∆ log(λe) -0.030*** -0.015* -0.001 -0.019
(0.005) (0.001) (0.017) (0.021)
Sum squared resid 4129572 289978.6 520650.5 248959.7
R2 0.574 0.274 0.556 0.252
Within R2 0.573 0.274 I Adj R2 0.555 0.252
Hausman test H = 123.966 H = 17.148, - -
p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.02 - -
Durbin–Watson 2.771 2.758 - -
Akaike criterion 2644884 211773.0 255778.6 139974.6
Table 2: Model (a): FE in credit (interbank) market using 543065 (45030) observa-
tions. Included 1000 (50) cross-sectional units. Time-series length: minimum 376 (536),
maximum 1007 (1415). OLS in credit (interbank) market, using observations 1-113251
(1-30782) n = 49216 (n = 27830).
2016; He´mous D. and Olsen M., 2017).
The impact of the loyal strategy on the credit allocation is better investigate in the OLS
model presented in the last two columns of Tab.2, where we run the same regression as
in Model (a), but considering as sample just the subset of loyal borrowers in both sys-
tem. The results of the OLS model reproduce the same dynamics of the above-described
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model but with a higher magnitude of many of the estimated coefficients. In particular,
it is worth noting that, when the sample is just composed by loyal borrowers, the value
of coefficients describing the network centrality (i.e. β, C and deg) are magnified with
respect to the complete sample. Once more, this result highlights the impact of the loyal
borrowers on centralizing the credit network and the resulting effect in generating credit
crunch phenomena.
Let us now describe Model (b), where the macroeconomic consequences of agents’ char-
acteristics and credit network architecture are investigated. Here, the dependent variable
is the firms’ production Yb which, in our simple framework, reflects the aggregate out-
put. Control variables are: i) the firm rationing Rb and granted loan L
g
b , on the real side
of the economy, ii) the borrower intensity of choice βb, its square value β
2
b , the lender
degree dege and the lender centrality score Ce, on the financial side of the credit market.
Furthermore, we include a dummy variable accounting for the role of loyalty, is loyal.
Tab.3 shows Model b) regression results. Not surprisingly, the two real variables, namely
rationing and granted loan, have the expected impact on the production (i.e. they neg-
atively and positively affect the macroeconomic outcome, respectively).
The impact of the network variables on the macroeconomic performances well aligns
with the results described above. Specifically, our findings confirm the negative impact
of the network centrality on the aggregate output, as demonstrated by the negative
value of the lender centrality and lender degree coefficients. Regarding the effect of the
intensity of choice parameter, our estimates support the presence of a nonlinear rela-
tionship between loyalty and production. Indeed, a moderate loyalty level allows firms
to grow, as demonstrated by the positive value of β ≈ 0.04. However, an excessive level
of loyalty reduces production, as confirmed by the negative value of β2 ≈ −0.02. The
U-shaped relation between loyalty and macroeconomic performances can be explained
by the emergence of bottleneck phenomena in the credit allocation due to the excessive
network centralization.
Finally, the econometric analysis reveals a non-statistical significance of the dummy,
is loyal, on the production. As already highlighted in session 3.1, where the perfor-
mance between the two strategies are analyzed, the weak supremacy of loyal agents in
terms of average wealth is weakened by the strong variance associated with this strat-
egy. The fact that the loyal strategy does not have a statistically significant impact on
production further strengthens this result.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed in a multi-market framework, composed by goods, credit
and interbank system, the impact of agents’ behavior and network topology on busi-
ness fluctuations. By implementing an endogenous mechanism of credit-links formation,
which evolves via the co-movement of borrowers-lenders’ specific variables, we have been
able to reproduce a dynamic financial system where agents can switch strategies. Specif-
ically, on the one hand, lenders try to attract clients by offering liquidity at subsidized
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Model b: Fixed-effects, using 394008 observations
Included 1000 cross-sectional units
Time-series length: minimum 262, maximum 715
Dependent variable: ∆ log(Yb)
Robust (HAC) standard errors
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0359692 0.000300487 119.7030 0.0000
∆ log(Rb) −0.0218479 0.000446293 −48.9543 0.0000
∆ log(Lgb) 0.134123 0.00269082 49.8446 0.0000
∆ log(Ce) −0.0349404 0.000951759 −36.7114 0.0000
∆ log(dege) −0.0831739 0.00361431 −23.0124 0.0000
∆ log(βbF ) 0.0431854 0.00291757 14.8018 0.0000
∆ log(βbF )
2 −0.0215606 0.00291583 −7.3943 0.0000
is loyal 0.000363729 0.00146713 0.2479 0.8042
Mean dependent var 0.034404 S.D. dependent var 0.518889
Sum squared resid 43972.49 S.E. of regression 0.334498
LSDV R2 0.585496 Within R2 0.584473
F (1006, 393001) 551.8123 P-value(F ) 0.000000
Log-likelihood −127081.4 Akaike criterion 256176.8
Schwarz criterion 267137.1 Hannan–Quinn 259310.6
ρˆ −0.384968 Durbin–Watson 2.573795
Joint test on named regressors –
Test statistic: F (7, 393001) = 78969.6
with p-value = P (F (7, 393001) > 78969.6) = 0
Test for differing group intercepts –
Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
Test statistic: F (999, 393001) = 1.67034
with p-value = P (F (999, 393001) > 1.67034) = 2.63515e-36
Hausman test statistic –
H = 766.39
with p-value = P (χ2(7) > 766.39) = 3.31395e-161
Table 3: Model (b)
rates; on the other hand, borrowers establish loyal relationships based on the previously
granted loan. The co-movement between these two forces generates an evolutionary
system where the lenders’ competition to attract clients and the borrowers’ switching
between the loyal and shopping-around strategy reproduce different networks configura-
tions ranging from the random to the scale-free one. This simple mechanism of dynamic
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interaction, therefore, has allowed us to analyze both the individual performances of
lenders and borrowers, and the macroeconomic consequences of their interconnection.
Our findings have detected a trade-off between micro and macro performances. At the
individual levels, indeed, our analysis has shown that, on the one side, landers have
an incentive to act as hubs and, on the other side, borrowers have a benefit to behave
as loyal clients. At the aggregate level, however, the coexistence of these two attitudes
generates gridlock effects in the network and the emergence of credit crunch phenomena.
More in detail, our results have suggested that the appearance of a large lending finan-
cial institution able to attract many loyal customers tends to centralize too much the
financial system, and this causes adverse effects on the credit supply and the aggregate
outcome. Overall, we have detected that a possible reason for cycles to appear is the
clash between the two system attractors, that is the tension between shopping-around
and loyal agents. Indeed, the former work as a thermostat of the system by realigning
macroeconomic time series to its ”fundamental” level, while the latter generate macroe-
conomic instability and financial bubbles.
Obviously, these findings are specific to the model, but they offer an interesting further
insight into the nature of economic fluctuations and suggest some economic policy coun-
termeasures. First, our analysis shows that the regulator should pay more attention to
the architecture of the credit market and try to avoid network concentration phenomena.
Second, the police maker should redirect the credit system to small local banks able to
meet the financial needs of a limited number of loyal clients. This would allow i) to
avoid gridlock effects and credit-crunch phenomena ii) to closely monitor the financial
conditions of borrowers iii) to limit bailout policies applied to systemically important
financial institutions (i.e. hubs in our context).
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Appendix A
Descriptive output validation
In this Appendix we show that our model is capable to reproduce a remarkable high
number of empirically observed regularities, spanning from industrial dynamic to growth
type stylized facts (see Delli Gatti et al., 2007, for a list of these stylized facts). The
proposed exercise is therefore a descriptive output validation confirming that the simu-
lated results match many real evidences (see Tesfatsion, 2017). It is worth noting that
the model ability in reproducing empirical evidences strengthens the analysis conducted
in previous sessions. The findings presented in this papers, in fact, can be considered
reliable (or at least useful in the interpretation of business cycles) just because the model
reproduces many real events.
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Figure 8: Zipf plot of firms and banks’ size, left and center panel respectively. Firms’ growth rate
distribution, right panel.
Firstly, we investigate some very well-known facts concerning industrial dynamics. The
left and central panel of Fig. 8 show the distribution of firms and banks’ size, respec-
tively. Although agents in our model start with the same initial conditions, trading
generates a fat tail distribution of agents’ size, in accordance with the empirical evi-
dence that, in real industrialized economies, market participants are very heterogeneous
in dimension (see for example, Zipf, 1949; Ijiri and Simon, 1977; Axtell, 2001; Pushkin
and Aref, 2004; Gabaix et al., 2006). Specifically, our statistical analysis shows that
both firms and banks’ size distributions are power law, as confirmed by the Hill estima-
tor of the α exponent equals to 1.28 and 1.00 for companies and financial institutions,
respectively. Moreover, the right panel of Fig. 8 shows the model ability in reproducing
the Laplace distribution in the firms’ growth rate (see Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi and
Secchi, 2003, for empirical evidences). The values of the local parameter µ = 0.033 and
scale parameter b = 0.028 obtained with the Maximum likelihood estimation confirm
this result. Finally, always in accordance with the industrial dynamics evidences, our
results confirm that the individual growth rate volatility is higher than the aggregate
one (see, for instance Amaral, L.A.N. et al., 1997; Canning et al., 1998). The average
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value over time and simulations of the former is 0.57 (st. dev 0.28) , while of the later
is 0.00 (st. dev 0.03).
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Figure 9: Zipf plot of amount of loans, bad debts and bankruptcies; left, center and right panel
respectively.
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version.
Let us now verify the model ability in reproducing financial stylized facts. Fig. 9
shows the zipf plots of loans, bad-debts and bankruptcies. In accordance with empiri-
cal studies (see Fujiwara, 2004; Delli Gatti et al., 2004) these distributions are skewed.
Specifically, our results detect a power law distribution for loans and bad debts, with the
Hill estimator of α equals to 1.17 and 1.25, respectively, while a Weibull distribution for
bankruptcies, with the MLE of the shape parameter α = 1.97 and the scale parameter
λ = 389.21. It is worthy of note that, in our model, expansions are driven by credit
granting, while contractions by bad debt and bankruptcies. These skewed distributions
confirm that small and medium sized events dominate our system. Large events are
relatively rare but, in the case of appearance, have a devastating effect on the economy
(see Gabaix, 2011; Taleb, 2007, for a similar interpretation). Last but not least, we ana-
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lyze the effect of the interest rates on business cycles. In this regard, we find a negative
correlation equal to −0.12 between interest rates and production, suggesting counter-
cyclical real short term interest rates (see Aghion et al., 2015; Aguiar and Gopinath,
2007; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005). In our model, in fact, interest
rates first have a positive, significant, and robust impact on the economic growth then,
during recessions, the effect revers and, via the financial accelerator mechanism, interest
rates become harmful tools for propagating contagion.
The last part of this Appendix is devoted to business cycle facts. Left and center panel
of Fig. 10 display the probability density function of aggregate growth rates and the zipf
plot of negative cumulative growth rate, respectively. In line with empirical evidences
(see Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003; Di Guilmi et al., 2004), our model
reproduces the Laplace distribution in the aggregate growth rate with the Maximum
likelihood estimation of µ = 0.0015 and b = 0.019 and the Weibull distribution in cumu-
lative growth rate. Finally, the right panel of Fig. 10 shows that firms’ size distribution
shifts over the business cycle. Specifically, in accordance with Gaffeo et al. (2003) we
observe an expansion in the firms’ size during economic booms, while a decline during
bursts.
Other important business cycle facts, such as excess volatility and volatility clustering
in the output growth rate, have been already shown in Sec. 3.2. We refer the reader to
that session for the empirical analysis.
Appendix B
A sensitivity analysis on the model time scale
In this appendix we investigate the main performances of our model by relaxing two
hypotheses. Specifically, i) we create a desynchronization between the credit and the
interbank market, so that the latter operates at higher time frequency; ii) we relax the
assumption that agents update their strategies at each time step. In both of these ex-
periments, we run our model 10 times for different values of the initial seed generating
the pseudo-random numbers over a time span of T = 2000 periods. Moreover, all the
agents’ initialization parameters coincide with those presented in Sec. 3.
Let us start by describing how the point i) is implemented and its consequences on the
model results.
This mismatch is generated by creating a desynchronization between firm and bank ac-
tivation. Specifically, whereby banks are always operating, just a subgroup of firms are
operating each period. Active companies are chosen randomly in such a way that only a
percentage of firms re-update their production and credit choices each period. This naive
mechanism generates a mismatch between firm and bank data frequency. In fact, finan-
cial institutions operating in the interbank market each period generate data at higher
frequency than companies. The latter, in fact, which are not always active in the credit
market, create lower-frequency data. Simulated results show an important difference
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compared with the baseline model where 100% of firms are always active. Specifically,
by decreasing the number of active firms the average percentage of agents’ rationing
linearly decreases, as shown in the left panel of Fig. 11. Also the GDP decreases as the
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Figure 11: Average percentage of agents’ rationing (left), average GDP (middle), and average network
centrality (right), over all times and all simulations as a function of the percentage of active firms.
number of active companies decreases (see center panel of Fig. 11). However this decay
is not linear. On the one hand, in fact, it is true that lower production is associated
with the lower number of active companies. On the other hand, however, the rationing
reduction associated with the smaller number of active firms partially compensates for
the fall in the aggregate output. This second effect is clearly evident from the slope
of the line shown in the center panel of Fig. 11, where we can observe a decreasing
rate in the GDP fall by reducing the percentage of active firms. More interesting is the
dynamics of the credit network centrality22 shown in the right panel of Fig. 11. As the
reader can notice this network measure remains constant for low values of active compa-
nies. When the percentage of active companies exceeds 20%, the network is on average
more centralized. Furthermore, as shown in the figure, once exceeded this percentage,
the centrality standard deviation significantly increases. This fact demonstrates a key
element of our simulated system: the financial network crosses states of higher and lower
centralization and the succession of these states strongly depend on the joint activation
of the credit and the interbank market . When, in fact, only a few companies are ac-
tive, credit relations often end up in the credit market. As the percentage of operating
companies increases, instead, the need for banks to enter the interbank market to fi-
nance themselves increases substantially and this generates the well-known phenomenon
of creation/destruction of the hub with the consequent centralization/decentralization
of the network. Moreover, from the dynamical point of view the network evolution has
the expected effects on business cycles. In fact, as we can notice by compering right and
middle panel of Fig.11, a higher volatility in the centrality is associated with a higher
volatility in the GDP. This finding reinforces our hypothesis on the correlation between
GDP fluctuations and financial network centralization.
Finally, let us investigate how different time frequencies in the activation of the behav-
22Results on the interbank network centrality are omitted but very similar in spirit.
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ioral switching mechanism influence the model dynamics. To this end, we introduce a
parameter able to model the probability to switch. Specifically, our agents re-update
their strategies only if a random number uniformly distributed between zero and one
is higher than a selected threshold z. Consequently, by increasing this threshold the
switching probability decreases. In what follows, we study the main changes of our dy-
namics for z = 0; 0.2; 0.5; 0.723. The simulated results, here presented, although referred
just to the credit market –results on the interbank network are omitted as they are very
similar in spirit–,confirm that our general findings are robust but with an important
difference. At the micro level, results are quite obvious. In fact, as z increases, the per-
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Figure 12: Percentage of loyal and shopper around borrowers, black solid line and red dotted line,
respectively, for z = 0.2 (top left panel) and z = 0.7 (top right panel). Average number of loyal strategy
bubbles (bottom left panel) and their duration (bottom right panel) as function of z. The reported
results just concern the credit market.
centage of agents switching from one strategy to the other one clearly decreases linearly.
At the aggregate level, however, the dynamics is more interesting. In fact, by increasing
z two phenomena emerge. On the one hand, we observe a lower number of switching
23The value z = 0, corresponding to the baseline case where strategies are updated each time period.
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corresponding to long periods of stable division between the two groups of strategies.
On the other hand, once triggered the switching, we notice that this persists longer over
time and generates a kind of stickiness which guarantees the supremacy of a strategy
over the other for long time periods. These two aggregate phenomena are analyzed as
follow. Given the simulated percentage of agents adopting the loyal strategy24 as shown
in the black solid lines of Fig.12, we calculate the average number and duration of the
time-series bubbles over time and simulations as a function of z. The average number
of bubbles, calculated as the number of local maxima of the filtered series25, gives us
an idea on the switching frequency, while the average number of the bubbles’ duration,
calculated as the base of the triangle which includes the points from trough-to-trough
of the filtered series, informs us on the strategy persistence. The results, reported in the
bottom panels of Fig.12, show that a reduction in the switching probability reduces the
number of times in which the loyal strategy dominates but increases its duration.
It is worthy of note that the percentage of loyal agents drives the intensity of choice
parameter β which, in turn, determines the network evolution. Consequently, by vary-
ing z, the dynamics of the credit network centrality follows a similar pattern in term
of average number and duration of the bubbles to that presented in the bottom panels
of Fig.12. At this point the implication on the simulated business cycle are obvious:
with the reduction of the switching probability recessions decrease but their duration
increases26.
24Since the two strategies’ percentages are reciprocal, the same results would be obtained using the
simulated percentage of the shopping around strategy
25Given that the simulated time series are noisy, we extract the trend component by means of a
Hodrick-Prescott filter We, then, use the detrended series to analyze the bubbles phases.
26Simulated results are omitted because similar to the ones shown in Fig.12.
34
References
Acemoglu D., Ozdaglar A.E., and Tahbaz-Salehi A. Systemic risk and stability in fi-
nancial networks. MIT Department of Economics Working Paper, 13-03, 2013. doi:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2211345orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2211345.
Adrian T. and Shin H.S. Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation,
19(3):418 – 437, 2010a.
Adrian T. and Shin H.S. The changing nature of financial intermediation and the finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2009. Annual Review of Economics, 2(1):603–618, 2010b.
Adrian T. and Shin H.S. Financial intermediary balance sheet management. Annual
Review of Financial Economics, 3(1):289–307, 2011.
Affino M. Do interbank customer relationships exist? And how did they function in the
crisis? Learning from Italy. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(12):3163–3184, 2012.
Aghion P., Farhi E., and Kharroubi E. Liquidity and growth: the role of countercyclical
interest rates. Working Paper 489, Bank for International Settlements, February 2015.
Aguiar M. and Gopinath G. Emerging market business cycles: The cycle is the trend.
Journal of Political Economy, 115(1):69–102, 2007.
Aikman D., Haldane A.G., and Nelson B.D. Curbing the credit cycle. The Economic
Journal, 125(585):1072–1109, 2015.
Albert R. and Baraba´si A.L. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Reviews of
modern physics, 74(1):47, 2002.
Amaral L.A.N., Buldyrev S.V., Havlin S., Leschhorn H., Maass P., Salinger M.A., Stan-
ley H.E., and Stanley M.H.R. Scaling behavior in economics: I. empirical results for
company growth. J. Phys. I France, 7(4):621–633, 1997.
Avery R.B. and Samolyk K.A. Bank consolidation and small business lending: The role
of community banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 25(2-3):291–325, 2004.
Axtell R.L. Zipf distribution of u.s. firm sizes. Science, 293(5536):1818–1820, 2001.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The international interbank market: A de-
scriptive study. BIS Economic Papers, 8:, 1983, July.
Bargigli L. and Tedeschi G. Interaction in agent-based economics: A survey on the net-
work approach. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 399(Supplement
C):1 – 15, 2014.
Bargigli L., di-Iasio G., Infante L., Lillo F., and Pierobon F. The multiplex structure of
interbank networks. Quantitative Finance, 15(4):673–691, 2015.
35
Bartelsman E., Scarpetta S., and Schivardi F. Comparative analysis of firm demographics
and survival: evidence from micro-level sources in oecd countries. Industrial and
Corporate Change, 14(3):365–391, 2005.
Bassetto M., Cagetti M., and De Nardi M. Credit crunches and credit allocation in a
model of entrepreneurship. Review of Economic Dynamic, 18(1):53–76, 2015.
Battiston S., Delli Gatti D., Gallegati M., Greenwald B., and Stiglitz J.E. Credit chains
and bankruptcy propagation in production networks. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 31(6):2061 – 2084, 2007.
Battiston S., Delli Gatti D., Gallegati M., Greenwald B., and Stiglitz J.E. Liaisons dan-
gereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 36(8):1121 – 1141, 2012a.
Battiston S., Delli Gatti D., Gallegati M., Greenwald B., and Stiglitz J.E. Default
cascades: When does risk diversification increase stability? Journal of Financial
Stability, 8(3):138 – 149, 2012b.
Berardi S. and Tedeschi G. From banks’ strategies to financial (in) stability. International
Review of Economics & Finance, 47:255–272, 2017.
Berger A.N. and Black L.K. Bank size, lending technologies, and small business fi-
nance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(3):724 – 735, 2011. Australasian Finance
Conference: Global financial crisis, international financial architecture and regulation.
Berger A.N. and Frame W.S. Small business credit scoring and credit availability. Journal
of Small Business Management, 45(1):5–22, 2007.
Berger A.N. and Udell G.F. Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance.
The Journal of Business, 68(3):351–381, 1995.
Bernanke B. and Gertler M. Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations. The
American Economic Review, pages 14–31, 1989.
Bernanke B., Gertler M., and Gilchrist S. The financial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework. Handbook of macroeconomics, 1:1341–1393, 1999.
Bianconi G. and Baraba´si A.L. Competition and multiscaling in evolving networks. EPL
(Europhysics Letters), 54(4):436, 2001.
Bank for International Settlements BIS. Basel III: A global regulatory framework for
more resilient banks and banking systems, 2010.
Boot A.W.A. Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial Interme-
diation, 9(1):7 – 25, 2000. ISSN 1042-9573.
Borio C. The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt? Journal of
Banking & Finance, 45(Supplement C):182 – 198, 2014.
36
Boss M., Elsinger H., Summer M., and ThurnerS. Network topology of the interbank
market. Quantitative Finance, 4(6):677–684, 2004.
Bottazzi G. and Secchi A. Why are distributions of firm growth rates tent-shaped?
Economics Letters, 80(3):415 – 420, 2003.
Brock W.A. and Hommes C.H. A rational route to randomness. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pages 1059–1095, 1997.
Brunnermeier M.K., Eisenbach T.M., and Sannikov Y. Macroeconomics with financial
frictions: A survey. Working Paper 18102, National Bureau of Economic Research,
2012.
Butler J, Giuliano P, and Guiso L. The Right Amount of Trust. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 14(5):1155-1180, 2016.
Caccioli F., Catanach T.A., and Farmer J.D. Heterogeneity, correlations and financial
contagion. Advances in Complex Systems, 15(supp02):1250058, 2012.
Canning D., Amaral L.A.N., Lee Y., Meyer M., and Stanley H.E. Scaling the volatility
of gdp growth rates. Economics Letters, 60(3):335 – 341, 1998. ISSN 0165-1765.
Cao M. and Shi S. Screening, bidding, and the loan market tightness. Review of Finance,
5(1-2):21–61, 2001.
Carlstrom C.T. and Fuerst T.S. Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations:
A computable general equilibrium analysis. The American Economic Review, 87(5):
893–910, 1997.
Catullo E., Grilli R., Palestrini A., and Gallegati M. Early warning indicators and
macro-prudential policies: A credit network agent based model. Journal of Economic
Interaction and Coordination, pages 1–35, 2017.
Chiarella C., Iori G., and Perello´ J. The impact of heterogeneous trading rules on the
limit order book and order flows. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(3):
525–537, 2009.
Christiano L. and Ikeda D. Government Policy, Credit Markets and Economic Activity.
NBER Working Papers 17142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2011.
Clauset A., Shalizi C.R., and Newman M. Power-law distributions in empirical data.
SIAM review, 51(4):661–703, 2009.
De Grauwe P., and Macchiarelli C. Animal spirits and credit cycles. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 59, 95–117, 2015.
Delli Gatti D., Di Guilmi C., Gaffeo E., Giulioni G., Gallegati M., and Palestrini A.
Business cycle fluctuations and firms’ size distribution dynamics. Advances in Complex
Systems, 07(02):223–240, 2004.
37
Delli Gatti D., Di Guilmi C., Gaffeo E., Giulioni G., Gallegati M, and Palestrini A. A
new approach to business fluctuations: heterogeneous interacting agents, scaling laws
and financial fragility. Journal of Economic behavior & organization, 56(4):489–512,
2005.
Delli Gatti D., Gaffeo E., Gallegati M., Giulioni G., Kirman A., Palestrini A., and
Russo A. Complex dynamics and empirical evidence. Information Sciences, 177(5):
1204 – 1221, 2007.
Delli Gatti D., Gallegati M., Greenwald B., Russo A., and Stiglitz J.E. Business fluc-
tuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network economy. Journal of
Economic Interaction and Coordination, 4(195), 2009.
Delli Gatti D., Gallegati M., Greenwald B., Russo A., and Stiglitz J.E. The financial
accelerator in an evolving credit network. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
34(9):1627 – 1650, 2010.
Di Guilmi C., Gaffeo E., and Gallegati M. Empirical results on the size distribution
of business cycle phases. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 333
(Supplement C):325 – 334, 2004.
Dinger V. and Von-Hagen J. Does interbank borrowing reduce bank risk? Discussion
Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems,223
:2007.
Ferri P. and Minsky H.P. Market processes and thwarting systems. Structural Change
and Economic Dynamics, 3(1):79–91, 1992.
Fujiwara Y. Zipf law in firms bankruptcy. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications, 337(1):219 – 230, 2004.
Gabaix X. The granular origins of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 79(3):733–772,
2011.
Gabaix X., Gopikrishnan P., Plerou V., and Stanley H.E. Institutional investors and
stock market volatility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):461–504, 2006.
Gaffeo E., Gallegati M., and Palestrini A. On the size distribution of firms: additional
evidence from the g7 countries. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
324(1):117 – 123, 2003.
Gaunersdorfer A., Hommes C.H., and Wagener F. Bifurcation routes to volatility clus-
tering under evolutionary learning. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
67(1):27–47, 2008.
Geanakoplos J. The leverage cycle. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume
24, pages 1–65. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2010.
38
Gertler M. and Kiyotaki N. Financial intermediation and credit policy in business cycle
analysis. volume 3 of Handbook of Monetary Economics, pages 547 – 599. Elsevier,
2010.
Gertler M., and Williamson S. Introduction to the special issue on money, credit, and
financial frictions. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(1):1–2, 2015.
Glasserman P. and Young H.P. How likely is contagion in financial networks? Journal
of Banking and Finance, 50(Supplement C):383 – 399, 2015.
Greenwald B.C. and Stiglitz J.E. Financial market imperfections and business cycles.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 1993.
Grilli R., Tedeschi G., and Gallegati M. Bank interlinkages and macroeconomic stability.
International Review of Economics & Finance, 34:72 – 88, 2014.
Grilli R., Tedeschi G., and Gallegati M. Markets connectivity and financial contagion.
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 10(2):287–304, 2015.
Grilli R., Iori G., Stamboglis N., and Tedeschi G. A networked economy: A survey on the
effect of interaction in credit markets. In Gallegati M., Palestrini A., and Russo A.,
editors, Introduction to Agent-Based Economics, pages 229 – 252. Academic Press,
2017.
He´mous D. and Olsen M. Long-term Relationships: Static Gains and Dynamic In-
efficiencies. Journal of the European Economic Association, jvx019, 2017. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx019.
Hommes C.H. Heterogeneous agent models in economics and finance. Handbook of
computational economics, 2:1109–1186, 2006.
Ijiri Y. and Simon H. Skew distributions and the sizes of business firms. Ed: North
Holland, New York., 1977.
Iori G., Jafarey S., and Padilla F.G. Systemic risk on the interbank market. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 61(4):525 – 542, 2006.
Iori G., De Masi G., Precup O.V., Gabbi G., and Caldarelli G. A network analysis of
the italian overnight money market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32
(1):259–278, 2008.
Jorda` O., Schularick M., and Taylor A.M. Leveraged bubbles. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 76(Supplement):S1 – S20, 2015.
Kaminsky G.L., Reinhart C.M., and Ve`gh C.A. When it rains, it pours: Procyclical
capital flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 19:11–53,
2004.
39
Kiyotaki N. and Moore J. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211–248,
1997.
Kukacka J. and Barunik J.. Estimation of financial agent-based models with simulated
maximum likelihood. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 85(Supplement C):
21 – 45, 2017.
Lageras A. and Seim D. Strategic complementarities, network games and endogenous
network formation. International Journal of Game Theory, 45(3):497–509, 2016.
Lenzu S. and Tedeschi G. Systemic risk on different interbank network topologies.
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 391(18):4331–4341, 2012.
Lux T and Marchesi M. Volatility clustering in financial markets: a microsimulation
of interacting agents. International journal of theoretical and applied finance, 3(04):
675–702, 2000.
Mayer C. New issues in corporate finance. European Economic Review, 32(5):1167 –
1183, 1988.
Minsky H.P. Longer waves in financial relations: Financial factors in the more severe
depressions. The American Economic Review, 54(3):324–335, 1964.
Mishkin F.S. How should we respond to asset price bubbles? Banque de France Financial
Stability Review–Valuation and Financial Stability, (12):65–74, 2008.
Montagna M., and Kok C. Multi-Layered Interbank Model For Assessing Systemic Risk.
ECB Working Paper, 1944:, 2016.
Neumeyer P.A. and Perri F. Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest
rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2):345 – 380, 2005.
Ongena S. and Smith D.C. Bank relationships: a review. In Zenios S.A. and Harker P.,
editors, Performance of Financial Institutions, pages 221 – 258. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge), 2000.
Petersen M.A. and Rajan R.G. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from
small business data. The Journal of Finance, 49(1):3–37, 1994.
Petersen M.A. and Rajan R.G. The effect of credit market competition on lending
relationships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2):407–443, 1995.
Presbitero A.F., Udell G.F., and Zazzaro A. The home bias and the credit crunch: A
regional perspective. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(s1):53–85, 2014.
Pushkin D.O. and Aref H. Bank mergers as scale-free coagulation. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 336(3):571 – 584, 2004.
40
Rajan R.G. Why bank credit policies fluctuate: A theory and some evidence*. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2):399–441, 1994.
Recchioni M.C., Tedeschi G., and Gallegati M. A calibration procedure for analyzing
stock price dynamics in an agent-based framework. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 60(Supplement C):1 – 25, 2015.
Stanca L. and Gallegati M. The dynamic relation between financial positions and in-
vestment: evidence from company account data. Industrial and Corporate Change, 8
(3):551–572, 1999.
Stanley M.H.R., Amaral L.A.N., Buldyrev S.V., Havlin S., Leschhorn H., Maass P.,
Salinger M.A., and Stanley H.E. Scaling behavior in the growth of companies. Nature,
379:804–806, 1996.
Strahan P.E. and Weston J.P. Small business lending and the changing structure of the
banking industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(6):821 – 845, 1998.
Taleb N.N. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Ed: Penguin Books,
2007.
Tedeschi G., Iori G., and Gallegati M. The role of communication and imitation in limit
order markets. The European Physical Journal B, 71(4):489, 2009.
Tedeschi G., Iori G., and Gallegati M. Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise
and fall of gurus. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1):82–96, 2012a.
Tedeschi G., Mazloumian A., Gallegati M., and Helbing D. Bankruptcy cascades in
interbank markets. PloS one, 7(12):e52749, 2012b.
Tesfatsion L. Web site on validation of ace.
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/empvalid.htm, 2017.
Tedeschi G., Vitali S., and Gallegati M. The dynamic of innovation networks: a switching
model on technological change. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 24(4):817– 834,
2014.
Vidal-Tomas D., Tedeschi G., and Ripolles J. The desertion of rich countries and the
mutual support of the poor ones: Preferential lending agreements among the PIGS.
Finance Research Letters, doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.08.003:, 2019.
Zipf K.G. Human behavior and the principle of least effort. Ed: Addison-Weslay, Read-
ing, MA., 1949.
41
